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Abstract
In most countries labor is organzed in cooperating skill-specic
unions rather than in industrial unions or separately bargaining skill-
specic unions. Within an extremely simple model of a small open
economy facing imperfect competition we show that this way of orga-
nizing labor can be explained as the outcome of rational (optimizing)
behavior on the part of the unions and the employers. Organizing la-
bor in local industrial cartels (regardless of skill) or a single economy
wide cartel results in a real wage level that is inappropriately low both
from the point of view of labor and the society as a whole unless labor
has close to monopoly power in the wage setting process. Organizing
labor in local or economy wide skill-specic unions may result in a
wage level that is too high. In addition, a labor market organized in
non-cooperating unions is likely to be unstable. This dilemma calls
for a compromise: A cartel of cooperating, independent skill-specic
unions. The degree and the form of the cooperation depend inter alia
on the bargaining power of the employer, the number of skills and
competing rms and the rigidity with which the unions enforce lines
of demarcations.
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1 Introduction
In most countries labor is organized in cooperating skill-specic unions rather
than in industrial cartels or separately bargaining skill-specic unions (see
e.g. Andersen and Risager 1990, Moene, Wallerstein and Hoel 1993, Scheuer
1995).
The aim of this paper is to present a model that can explain this phe-
nomenon as the outcome of rational (optimizing) behavior on the part of the
unions.
The model presented falls within the utility-maximizing-union strand of
literature. Its main distinguishing characteristics are: (1) Many, possibly
cooperating, skill-specic unions and many rms, (2) Closed-shop union-
ism, (3) Simultaneous wage-rate bargaining, (4) Employersright to manage,
(5) Union enforced demarcations, and (6) Specialized-small-open-economy
macroeconomic framework. Within this set-up we analyze the optimum or-
ganization of labor from the point of view of labor as a function of market
characteristics, technology and preferences.
The determinants of the way labor is organized and the impact on the
economy have been the topic of several papers. Important contributions
based on set-ups more or less resembling ours are Oswald (1979), Hersoug
(1983), Horn and Wolinsky (1988), Gylfason and Lindbeck (1984), Jun
(1989), Dowrick (1989), Holden and Raaum (1991), Moene, Wallerstein and
Hoel (1993), De Fraga (1993), Machin, Steward and van Reenen (1993) and
Naylor (1995). However, to our knowledge the combination of distinguishing
characteristics and the specic way in which they are modelled are novel and
open up for additional insights.
The economy modelled may be characterized as a sausage economy.
There is only one industry. The industry consists of n rms, each one located
on a separate island(i.e. factors are immobile between rms). All rms have
identical production technology and produce a homogeneous product. The
only input is labor. Labor comes in m di¤erent skills. Each skill group is of
identical size, and the elasticity of substitution between any pairs of skills is
the same. Labor decides the organization of the labor market. The utility
function of the representative union member reects risk aversion (in the
sense that the elasticity of utility with respect to the probability of being
employed is larger that the elasticity of utility with respect to the wage rate,
Dowrich 1989, de Fraga 1993) or insider power (in the sense that the unions
represent insiders who are protected by seniority and consequently cares little
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about the risk of being priced out of the market, Moene 1988) as well as envy
(in the sense that relative wages matter, Gylfason and Lindbeck 1983, Paldam
1989, Moene, Wallerstein and Hoel 1993). The wage rates are determined
jointly by the unions and the employers in a Nash bargaining process. The
rms have the right to manage; i.e. the rms determine unilaterally the
level and composition of employment. All production is exported and all
consumption goods imported. (Export) demand is a declining function of
price. Consequently, an increase in production and employment comes at the
cost of declining real wages and deteriorating terms of trade. Real national
income, contrary to employment and production, is not a monotonically
declining function of the real wage rate. This observation poses the question:
Which way of organizing the labor market results in highest union utility,
respectively, the highest real national income?
Within this simple setting we analyze the impact of four cleanways of
organizing labor: (1) Non-cooperating skill-specic local unions, (2) Local
(rm-level) industrial cartels, (3) Economy-wide skill-specic (joint) unions,
and (4) A single national industrial cartel. In cases (1) and (3) we extend the
analysis to encompass the empirically important fact that unions may enforce
demarcations, which reduce the feasible elasticity of substitution among skills
below the technically determined elasticity of substitution. As noted by
Hersoug (1983), where technical conditions allow substitution the union will
gain by enforcing articialsubstitution barriers.
Given the fact that all workers are assumed only to di¤er by skill and lo-
cation one might conjecture that labor would choose to fully centralize wage
negotiations: An all-encompassing union can always mimic the best decen-
tralized solution or do better. This conjecture is not true (as would be the
case if labor had the power to set the wage rate unilaterally). Decentralized
and uncoordinated wage negotiations between the rms and selshunions,
each of which empowered with the ability to hurt the rm(s) by calling a
strike, may increase the bargaining position of labor and possibly result in
a better outcome from the point of view of both labor and the economy
as a whole than a totally centralized bargaining process (Horn and Wolin-
sky 1988, Holden and Raaum 1991, Machin, Steward and van Reenen 1993,
Naylor 1995). In fact, within the model presented, the union utility maximiz-
ing wage level (as well as the real national income maximizing wage level) is
unattainable if labor is organized in either separately bargaining skill-specic
craft unions or in all-encompassing industrial unions. Contrary to Calmfors
and Drill (1988), who conclude that a decentralized labor market and a fully
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centralized labor market are superior to in-betweensolutions, we nd that
cooperating sovereign craft unions as observed in many successful economies
is, indeed, the optimum way of organizing labor.
The combination of independence and cooperation raises two problems
which appear generally overlooked in the literature. Independent actions
may turn the Nash-equilibrium solution unstable and too tight cooperation
may be incentive incompatible. The solution to both problems appear to be
carefully designed rules of the game.
The structure of the paper is as follows: In part 2 we set up the model and
determine employment, real national income and union utility as functions
of the equilibrium wage rate. In part 3 we solve the model and derive the
equilibrium wage rate under alternative ways of organizing the labor market
In part 4, we compare the results and analyze the conditions under which each
organizational form is optimal from the point of view of labor and from the
point of view of the society as a whole. In part 5, we address the stability
and incentive compatibility problems facing joint unions and establish the
necessary conditions for cartels to be incentive compatible. Part 6 sums up
the results of the analysis.
2 The basic framework
2.1 The prot function of the representative rm
The n rms in the industry produce a homogeneous product using identical
CES production technology
qi =
 
m
 1
 
mX
j=1
L
 1

ij
! 
 1
(1)
where qi = the production of the ith rm, m = the number of skills (and
local unions), Lij = the employment of workers with skill j in rm i and  =
the elasticity of substitution between any two pairs of skills ( = 0)
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The corresponding unit cost functions and labor demand functions are
ci =
 
1
m

mX
j=1
w
(1 )
ij
! 1
1 
(2)
Lij =
qi
m


ci
wij

(3)
where ci is the unit cost of the ith rm and wij is the wage rate of workers
with skill j in rm i:
Note that the specication of the production function implies that pro-
duction is equal to employment, qi =
P
Lij = Li, if the m skills are of
identical size, Lij = Lim . Correspondingly, if all workers in a rm receive the
same wage rate regardless of skill, wij = wi; then the unit production cost is
equal to the wage rate, ci = wi.
The demand function is assumed to be linear1,
Q = A  b  P
and the market characterized by Cournot competition.
The (inverse) demand curve facing the representative rm in a is
pi = P =
1
b
 (A Q) = 1
b

 
A 
nX
j=1
qj
!
(4)
The representative rms prot maximizing supply is
qi =
A
2
  ci  b
2
 
P
qj
2
; i 6= j (5)
The solution of the system of n supply equations2664
q1
q2

qn
3775 =
2664
2 1  1
1 2  1
   
1 1  2
3775
 1

2664
A  c1  b
A  c2  b

A  cn  b
3775 = 1n+ 1 
2664
n  1   1
 1 n   1
   
 1  1  n
3775
2664
A  c1  b
A  c2  b

A  cn  b
3775
(6)
1The assumed linearity is crucial. It implies that the higher the equilibrium wage rate
(unit cost) the higher the price and, consequently, the higher the elasticity of demand.
Dowrich (1989) assumes that the demand function is isoelastic, and Holden and Raaum
(1991) that the econo ny is completely open, i.e. that the pricelevel is exogenously deter-
mined.
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is
qi =
1
n+ 1

 
A  n  ci  b+
nX
j=1;j 6=i
cj  b
!
(7)
from which we derive the market supply, the market price, and the prot of
the representative ith rm
Q =
1
n+ 1

 
n  A  b 
nX
j=1
cj
!
(8)
P =
1
n+ 1

 
A
b
+
nX
j=1
cj
!
(9)
i = (qi)
2 =

1
n+ 1
2
 1
b

 
A  n  ci  b+ b 
nX
j=1;j 6=i
cj
!2
(10)
2.2 The union utility function
The total labor force L is normalized to one. Labor is assumed immobile
between locations (rms) and skills. The labor force in each location is 1
n
.
Each local union organizes 1
nm of the labor force.
Unions are assumed to maximize the utility of a representative worker.
For simplicity the utility function is isoelastic in the probability of being
employed, gross income and relative income:
Vij = (Lij  n m)  wij 

wij
ci

(11)
The utility function reects two psychological characteristics of most hu-
man beings: (1) risk aversion and (2) envy.
Lij  n  m is the employment rate of the workers organized by the jth
union at the ith location (= 1
nm). Consequently, Lij  n m  1 is also the
probability that a representative worker at location i organized in union j
becomes employed. If he is employed, he receives the income wij; if unem-
ployed, he receives nothing. His expected income is Lij n m wij. If he is risk
averse, he prefers a somewhat smaller risk-free income to a given expected
but risky income, i.e.  > 1.  = 1 corresponds to the case where the union
maximizes expected or average income.
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Alternatively,  < 1 may be interpreted as a measure of insider power.
Insiders are protected by seniority and, consequently, care less about the
e¤ect on employment of a wage increase. Pemberton (1988) argue that the
union utility function reect the median voter (ordered by seniority). In the
extreme case (Moene 1988) unions totally disregard the risk of unemployment
and care only about the wage rate,  = 0:
The last term of the utility function is the relative wage rate of the repre-
sentative worker compared to the average of the wage rates of all workers in
the same location (rm). Income is an important measure of a persons po-
sition in society. The parameter   0 measures the value the representative
worker attaches to position.
2.3 Solution of the model for a given wage rate
Substituting (7) into (3) for the resulting expression into (11) gives the utility
of the representative worker in the (i; j)th union as a function of his own
wage rate, the unit costs in his own rm and the wage costs of competing
rms,
Vij =

n
n+ 1


 
A  b  n  ci + b 
nX
j=1;j 6=i
cj
!
 c i  w1+ ij (12)
In symmetric equilibrium all wage rates are equal, wij = ci = c, and the
solution of the model as a function of c reduces to
qi =
1
n+ 1
 (A  c  b) (13)
L = Q =
n
n+ 1
 (A  c  b) (14)
P =
1
n+ 1


A
b
+ n  c

(15)
 =
n
(n+ 1)2
 1
b
 (A  c  b)2 (16)
Vij =

n
n+ 1

 (A  c  b)  c (17)
Y = Q  P = n
(n+ 1)2
 1
b
 (A  b  c)  (A+ b  n  c) (18)
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Unsurprisingly, production (Q), employment (L) and prots () are monoton-
ically declining functions and the price level (= terms of trade) (P ) a monoton-
ically increasing function of the wage rate. Union utility (V ) and real national
income in units of imported goods (Y ) depend not just on the level of em-
ployment but also on, respectively, the real wage rate (c) and the terms of
trade (P ). Consequently, the e¤ect on these variables of a wage increase is
ambiguous.
From eq. (17) and (18) we may derive the equilibrium wage rate that
maximizes union utility, respectively real national income,
cV =
A
b
 1
1 + 
(19)
cY =
A
b
 n  1
2  n (20)
As illustrated in gure 12, an increase in the wage level improves union
utility, if c < cV and raises real national income if c < c

Y . The wage rate
that maximizes real income may be higher than the wage rate that maximizes
union utility.
10.750.50.250
0.3
0.25
0.2
0.15
0.1
0.05
0
Wage rate
Figure 1: Real national income (thick solid line), Union utility (thin solid
line) and Prots (thin dashed line) as functions of the wage rate
2The graph is drawn on the following assumptions: A = b = 1;  = 1:5; n = 10: The
corresponding maximizing wage rates are cY = 0:48 and c

V = 0:40:
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3 Determination of the wage level
The wage level is determined in a Nash bargaining process. The maximizing
wage rate depends not just upon the bargaining power of the unions (") and
the parameters of the union utility function ( and ), the competition in
the goods market (the number of competitors, n), the number of skills (m)
and the competition among skills (measured by the elasticity of substitution
) but also on the way in which the labor market is organized.
In the following we analyze four di¤erent ways of organizing the labor
market: (a) Local, skill-specic unions (LU) ; (b) Economy-wide (or joint)
skill-specic unions (JU), (c) Local industrial cartels (LIC), and (d) An
economy-wide (national) industrial cartel (NIC) :
In addition to these four distinct ways of organizing labor we consider the
case of limited cooperation among skill-specic unions in the form of agree-
ments as to which union has the right to organizing a given function. These
so-called demarcations reduce the possibility of the employers to substitute
workers of one skill for workers of another skill below what would be possible
for purely technological reasons,
0  feasible < 
Reduced competition among skills strengthens the bargaining position of
the unions3.
3.1 Non-cooperating local unions (LU)
In this subsection we assume that every individual local union engages in
wage bargaining with its employer taking the wage level of all other unions -
local as well as those organizing labor in competing rms - as given. Admit-
tedly, this assumption is not very realistic. In particular, an employer might
take into account that a wage hike given to one union has an e¤ect on the
3To give an example from the history of labor relations in Denmark, typographers and
lithographers might easily substitute each other. The technological elasticity of substitu-
tion was high. However, the unions agreed upon which functions should be carried out by
typographers and which functions should be carried out by lithographers and they were
willing and able to enforce the agreed line of demarcation. As a consequence, the wage
level of typographeras and lithograhers was signicantly higer than that of skills with sim-
ilar length of education. Eventually, their powerbase dissolved due to the development of
IT-technology.
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wage demands of the other unions - positively or negatively depending on
the slope of the reaction functions. However, the case is a natural and useful
benchmark for evaluating the impact of union cooperation across skills and
locations.
The wage rate wij is determined by maximizing (the logarithm of) the
asymmetric Nash expression
lnNLU = "  ln(Vij   V ij) + (1  ") ln(i   i ) (21)
with respect to ln(wij) assuming all other wage rates remain constant.
The denition of the disagreement points V ij and 

i is crucial (Binmore
et al.1986). The terms denote, respectively, union utility and rm prot in
case no agreement is reached, and the union calls a strike or the employer a
lock-out. To simplify the calculations we shall assume that both V ij and 

i
are zero4. The parameter ", 0  "  1; measures the exogenously determined
bargaining power of the union, and 1  " that of the employer.
Substituting (12) for Vij in (21), (2) for ci and (10) for i and maximizing
the resulting expression with respect to wij gives the rst order condition
("   + 2  (1  ")) 
 
 n  ci
A  n  b  ci + b 
Pn
j 6=i cj
!
 1
m


ci
wij
 1
+("  (     ))  1
m


ci
wij
 1
+ "  (1 +     ) = 0; j 6= i (22)
Symmetric equilibrium implies that wij = ci = c for all unions and all
rms. Imposing this restriction reduces eq. (22) to,
cLU =
A
b
 m  (m  1)  (     )
m  (m  1)  (     ) + ( + 2  (1="  1))  n (23)
=
A
b
 a
a+ d  n (24)
a  m  (m  1)  (     ) (25)
d   + 2  (1="  1) > 0 (26)
4V ij = 0 is consistent with the assumption that labor is immobile between locations
(rms) and skills, and that striking workers have no alternative income. Striking workers
may get nancial support from the union, but as there is nobody to pay but the workers
themselves, the support should be considered a loan. If the employers righ to manage
does not include the right to lay o¤ non-striking workers, i is likely to be negative, unless
the elasticity of substitution is pretty high. However, as explained below, in this case a
positive solution is unlikely to exist.
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The solution is meaningful only if cLU > 0 and qLU = An+1 
 
dn
a+dn

> 0. As
d is always non-negative, the non-negativity or existence condition reduces
to a > 0, i.e.
 < max =

m
m  1 + 

 1

(27)
If the non-negativity condition is not satised, the wage rates will be
set at the unions reservation wage level, which in our model is zero. This
solution is organizationally unstablein the sense that labor has no incentive
to organize (and pay to) unions unless the unions are able to raise the wage
rate above the reservation wage level. The non-negativity condition is binding
for plausible values of the parameters5. For m = 2;  = 0 and  = 1,  may
not exceed 2; for m = 10,  = 0:5, and  = 1:5, a positive solution only
exists if  < 1:07: In addition, an interesting solution must be stable. The
derivation of the stability condition is given in section 5.2.
3.2 Local industrial cartels (LIC)
Organizing labor in local skill-specic unions implies that the various skills
compete. This competition is neutralized if labor organize in local industrial
cartels.
For simplicity we shall assume that the governing body of the local indus-
trial cartel attaches equal weight to the utility of the representative member
of each of the m cooperating local unions6,
VLIC;i =
Y
V
j
ij ; j =
1
m
All members of the cartel get the same wage rate regardless of skill: wij = ci.
This implies that the substitution term () and envy() terms vanish and
the number of skills (m) become irrelevant. The union objective function
reduces to
VLIC = (Li  n m)  ci = (qi  n)  ci (28)
5On the basis of Danish data for the period 1948-88, Risager (1993) estimated the elas-
ticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled workers to about 1.3 on the aggregate
level.
6In part 5.2 we argue that a wage setting cartel is incentive incompatible if it does not
attach equal weights to the welfare of the representative member of all cooperating unions.
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Maximizing the corresponding Nash expression
lnNLIC = "  ln(VLIC) + (1  ") ln(i) (29)
with respect to ci; assuming that unit costs of all other rms are constant,
gives the rst order condition
@ lnNLIC
@ci
=
"
ci
+("   + 2  (1  "))
 
 n  b
A  n  b  ci + b 
Pn
j 6=i cj
!
= 0 (30)
from which we derive the unit cost and wage rate in symmetric equilibrium,
w = c = ci = cj
cLIC =
A
b
 1
1 + ( + 2  (1="  1))  n (31)
=
A
b
 1
1 + d  n (32)
3.3 Economy-wide skill-specic (joint) unions (JU)
Typically, wage earners identify themselves more with their profession or
skill than with other skill-groups in the rm in which they are employed
and, supposedly, more so in former times than today. Consequently, workers
traditionally organized in economy-wide skill-specic unions, which for short
are denoted joint unions (JU).
A joint union organizing all employees with skill j maximizes
VJU =
Y
V iij ;
X
i = 1
As above, we assume that the governing body of the joint union attaches
equal weight to the welfare of all members, regardless of the rm in which
they are employed, i = 1n . This implies that the only way in which the game
is changed is that the individual joint union and the employers now take into
account that an increase in the wage rate of union j has the same e¤ect on
the unit costs of all n rms, ci = c: The indirect competition between workers
with identical skill employed by di¤erent rms is eliminated. The relative
position of the individual rm is una¤ected by a wage hike. The wage-setting
game becomes equivalent to the game between one of j unions and a single
(monopoly) rm.
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Maximizing the corresponding Nash-expression
lnNJU = "

  ln 1
2
+   ln (A  bc) + (   )  ln c+ (1 +   )  lnwj

+(1  ") 

ln
1
4
  ln b+ 2  ln (a  bc)

(33)
c =
 
1
m

mX
j=1
w
(1 )
j
! 1
1 
(34)
with respect to wj gives the rst order condition
(" + 2  (1  "))  b
A  bc + "(   )
1
c

1
m

c
wj

+"(1 +) 1
wj
= 0
(35)
from which, - making use of the symmetry assumption -we derive the wj = c
cJU =
A
b
 m  (m  1)  (     )
m  (m  1)  (     ) +  + 2  (1
"
  1)
=
A
b
 a
a+ d
(36)
3.4 A single economy-wide (national) industrial cartel
(NIC)
If labor wants to neutralize not just the competition among skills within
the individual rm but also the competition from workers employed in other
rms, they can do so by forming a single economy-wide (national) cartel.
The utility function of a single industrial cartel comprising all rms is
VNIC =
YY
V
j
ij
ai
;
X
i = 1;
X
j = 1 (37)
If the cartel attaches equal weight to the welfare of the representative
member of each local union regardless of skill and the rm in which they
are employed, i.e. i = 1n and j =
1
m
, the joint utility function reduces to
that of a representative local union VNIC = Vij. The Nash expression to be
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maximized with respect to ln(c) reduces to
lnNNIC = " 

 

ln

n
n+ 1

+ ln (1  c)

+ ln (c)

+(1  ")  2 

ln

1
n+ 1

+ ln (1  c)

(38)
and the rst order condition to
cNIC =
1
1 +  + 2  (1
"
  1) (39)
=
1
1 + d
(40)
4 Optimal choice of organization
4.1 Comparison of wage rates
Figures 2 shows the (Nash-equilibrium) wage rate as a function of the elastic-
ity of substitution and the way in which the labor market is organized7: LU
(lower curved line), LIC (lower horizontal solid line), JU (upper curved line
) and NIC (upper horizontal solid line). In addition, the gure depicts the
optimum wage rate from the point of view of labor, cV =
1
1+
, (thin dotted
line) and the optimum (real national income maximizing) wage level from
the point of view of society as a whole, cY =
n 1
2n (thick dotted line).
7The gure is drawn for n = 10; m = 10;  = 1:5; and  = 0:5: Union and the employers
are assumed to have equal barganing power (" = 0:5).
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Figure 2: The wage rate as a function of the elasticity of substitution and
way in which the labour market is organized
The gure illustrates a number of propositions which may readily be
inferred from the analysis above:
1. Concentration matters: The equilibrium wage rate is higher if labor
organizes in economy-wide (joint) skill-specic unions than if organized
in local unions and higher if labor organizes in a single economy-wide
(national) industrial cartel than if organized in local industrial cartels
cJU > cLU ; cNIC > cLIC
Proof: Follows directly from comparing eq. (24) and (36), respectively
eq. (32) and (40).
Intuition: By forming economy-wide organizations rather than local la-
bor neutralizes the (in)direct competition between workers of the same
skill, respectively all other workers employed in competing rms.
2. Organizing labor by skill rather than by industry results in a higher
equilibrium wage rate if and only if the adjusted rate of substitution is
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less than one8
cLU > cLIC and cJU > cNIC if Adj  1 + 

< 1
Proof: Comparing eq. (24) and (32), respectively eq. (36) and (40)
shows that the su¢ cient and necessary condition is  > 1. From eq.
(25) it follows that this is equivalent to Adj  1+ < 1.
Intuition: The share of total wage income that accrues to members of
a skill-specic union is an increasing function of its relative wage rate
if  < 1.
Corollary: If the unions by imposing demarcations can reduce the fea-
sible rate of substitution su¢ ciently, then they can always raise the
equilibrium wage rate to a higher level by organizing in skill-specic
unions than by organizing in a single industrial cartel.
3. The most decentralized way of organizing the labor market (LU) may
result in a higher wage level (and a correspondingly lower level of
production and employment) than the most centralized organization
(NIC). That will be the case if the elasticity of substitution and the
number of rms are very low,
cLU > cNIC if  <
1



+
m  n
m  1

Proof: Comparing eq. (24) and (40) shows that cLU > cNIC if a > n.
4. The ordering of the equilibrium wage rates as functions of the organi-
zation of the labor market is independent of the bargaining power of
the unions (") :
Proof: Follows from the fact that none of the bilateral comparisons
above depends on d:
Corollary: The ordering is also independent of the threat values V0
and 0. That follows from the fact that rasing the threat value of one
of the parties has an e¤ect on the Nash-bargaining equilibrium that is
8Cf. Horn and Wollinsky (1988) who concludes that the equilibrium form of unioniza-
tion is an encompassing union if the two types of labor are close substitutes and separate
unions if the tow types of labor are su¢ ciently strong complements.
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equivalent to raising the same partys bargaining power. Consequently,
the introduction of a tax-paid unemployment insurance system, which
raises the threat value of labor will not a¤ect the ordering of the equi-
librium wage rates (but raise the wage level regardless of the way in
which labor is organized).
5. The optimum wage level from the point of view of labor is lower than
the optimum (income maximizing) wage level from the point of society
as a whole if labor is risk averse ( > 1) and the number of competing
rms is large,
cV =
A
b
 1
1 + 
< cY =
A
b
 n  1
2  n if  >
n+ 1
n  1
Intuition: The income maximizing price is P  = A
2b . If n is large and,
consequently, P ! c, then the income maximizing wage rate is also A
2b .
All income accrues to labor. However, if workers are risk averse, they
prefer a lower and less risky income, i.e. a higher rate of employment
and a corresponding lower wage rate.
6. If labor does not have the power to set the wage rate unilaterally, then
the wage rate resulting from organizing the labor market in industrial
cartels (local or economy-wide) is always lower than the wage rate that
maximizes union utility, respectively real national income
cLIC < cNIC < c

V , cLIC < cNIC < c

Y
Proof: Follows from the fact that d   + 2  1
"
  1 >  for " < 1:
Corollary: The optimum way of organizing labor leaves some degree of
autonomy to skill-specic unions.
7. Organizing labor in economy-wide skill-specic unions (and possibly
in local skill-specic unions) is most likely to result in an equilibrium
wage rate that is above the optimum level from the point of view of
labour as well as from the point of view of society as a whole.
Proof: From eq. (36) and (19), respectively eq. (36) and 20) we have
that
cJU > c

V if d <   a; cJU > cY if d <
n+ 1
n  1  a
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For each individual union it is a dominant strategy to defend itsjobs,
i.e. impose the sti¤est possible demarcation lines thereby reducing
the feasible elasticity of substitution below the technically determined
elasticity of substitution. In the extreme case of feasible = 0, the
conditions may be written as
cJU > c

V if " >
2
2 + (m  1)  (1 + )  
cJU > c

Y if " >
2
2 + n+1
n 1  (m+ (m  1)  )  
Corollary: The optimum way of organizing labor requires cooperation of
skill-specic unions aiming at reducing the negative employment externatil-
ities of uncoordinated actions.
4.2 Preliminary conclusion
From propositions 6 and 7 is follows that none of the identied cleanways
of organizing the labor market is ideal, neither from the point of view of
labor nor from the point of view of society as a whole. The equilibrium wage
rate becomes too low, if labor organizes in a single national industrial cartel,
and too high, if labor organizes in economy-wide skill-specic unions and the
unions pursue their dominant strategy of imposing sti¤ demarcations.9
This result indicates that the best way of organizing labor is a compromise
between a single all-encompassing industrial cartel and independent skill-
specic unions.10
In fact, this characterization of the optimum organization of labor appears
to be a pretty precise description of the way labor is actually organized in
many countries.
9Cf. Hersoug (1989) who nds that the cooperative equilibrium wage rate is lower than
the Nash equilibrium wage rate if the skills are perfect complements.
10Machin, Steward and van Reenen (1993) argue that it is essential to distinguish be-
tween multiple unionism separate bargaining and multiple unionism joint bargaining. In
an empirical analysis they nd that plants with multiple unions and separate bargaining
arrangements pay higher wages compared to single union plants and plant with multiple
unions that bartgain jointly.
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5 Stability and incentive compatibility
5.1 The intrinsic instability of a labor marked orga-
nized by skills
The (Nash-equilibrium) wage rate determined in a labor market organized
in independent skill-specic unions is likely to be unstable.
To see that assume that in every period union ij and the employer i
agree on an adjustment of the wage rate wij assuming that the wages rates
of n m  1 other groups remain constant.
The adjustment process may be formalized as
wt = A wt 1 (41)
= An wt n
where w is a vector of wage rates of length n m and A the corresponding
transition matrix.
Consider the rst row of A: The rst element is 0. The next m   1
elements are @w11
@w1k
; k = 2; ::;m. The remaining (n  1) m elements are @w11
@whk
;
h = 1; ::; n, k = 1; ::;m. The symmetry assumption implies that all @w11
@w1k
are
identical (= 1) and all @w11@whk are identical (= 2). All rows contain the same
elements, although in di¤ering order.
The largest eigenvalue of A is
 = 1 + 2
1 = (m  1)  1; 2 = (n  1) m  2
and the associated eigenvector is a unit vector, u, of length n m
The wage determining process is stable if and only if jj < 111.
To derive 1 =
@wij
@wik
and 2 =
@wij
@whk
we take the total derivative of (22)
11Oswald (1979) assumes that all o¤-dioganal elements are positive and concludes that
stability requires that the o¤-dioganal elements og each row must sum to less than one.
Otherwise, loosely speaking, the system is so highly interdepebndent that anly deviation
from equuilibrium produces an explosive wage-wage spiral.
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and substitute (24) for wij = ci = cj in the resulting expression,
1 =
@wij
@wik
=
1  (a+d)a
m(1 +)(1 )d
(m  1) + (a+d)a
m(1 +)(1 )d
7 0 (42)
2 =
@wij
@whj
=
a2
nm(1 +)(1 )d
(m  1) + (a+d)a
m(1 +)(1 )d
 0 (43)
The ancillary variables a and d are dened in eq. (25) and (26).
The stability condition j = (m  1)  1 + (n  1) m  2j < 1 is com-
plicated and di¢ cult to interpret analytically. In stead we rely on analogies
to simple cases and simulations.
5.1.1 Stability in case of economy-wide skill-specic unions (n=1)
In the case labor is organized in economy-wide skill-specic unions (JU),
there is no competition among workers having the same skill employed in
di¤erent rms.  reduces to 1.
Consider the simplest possible case of two unions. The elasticity of sub-
stitution is zero, workers are risk neutral and do not su¤er from envy: n = 1;
m = 2;  = 0;  = 1;  = 0: The ancillary variables reduce to a = m = 2;
d = 2 "
"
: The unions maximize the expected income of their members. Due
to normalization chosen above, each unions employment rate is equal to Q:
Further, and inconsequentially, we have normalized A = b = 1:
For " = 1 (each union has monopoly power to dictate its wage rate) we
get
c =
w1 + w2
2
; Q =
1  c
2
=
1
2
  w1
4
  w2
4
Vi =

1
2
  wi
4
  w i
4

 wi
Each union maximizes its utility, Vi with respect to its wage rate. That
gives the rst order condition (reaction function)12
wi = 1  1
2
 w i
12Cf. Hersoug (1983) who as an example analyses a similar model (linear demand
function and two perfectly complementary skills.
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and the equilibrium solution
w1 = w2 = c =
2
3
; Q =
1
6
; P =
5
6
; Vi =
1
6
 2
3
=
1
9
The two skills are assumed to be perfect complements,  = 0; and, con-
sequently, the reaction function is negatively sloped,  = 1 =  12 . If one
union for some reason raises its wage rate above the equilibrium rate, the
optimum reaction of the other union is to reduce its rate13.
Oswald (1979), Gylfason and Lindbeck (1984) and de Fraga (1993) as-
sume that skills are gross substitutes and, consequently, that the reaction
functions are positively sloped. This is not an innocuous assumption. In fact,
in the two-monopoly-union case the reaction function is negatively sloped at
the equilibrium wage rate unless the elasticity of substitution is rather high
and the equilibrium wage rate correspondingly low.
This is illustrated in gure 3, which depicts the unionsreaction functions
in case of  = 0; 0.5, 1, 1.25, 1.5, and 1,75. The corresponding equilibrium
wage rates are 0.67, 0.6, 0.5, 0.43, 0.33, and 0.2. For  = 1 and  = 0 - no
risk aversion and envy e¤ects - the reaction functions are positively sloped
at equilibrium only if the elasticity of substitution exceeds 1:6:
13To understand why, it may be illustrative to calculate the elasticity of the i0th unions
employment rate (= Q) with respect to its wage rate, wi :
EQ;w1 = EQ;P  EP;c  Ec;w1 =

1  
5
6
1
6



1
2

2
3
5
6



1
2

2
3
2
3

=  5  0:4  0:5 =  1
As any other monopoly that faces no cost of production (the reservation wage rate is
assumed to be zero) the monoply union set its price (wage rate) such that the elasticity of
demand for its product (workers organized in the union) is -1. Assume that union 2 rises
its wage rate w2 by x. That will cause an increase of c by x2 and reduce production and
the employment rate by x4 : EQ;w1 falls below -1. Union 1s optimal reaction is to reduce
its wage rate.
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0.5
0.25
0
w2
w1
Figure 3: Reaction functions in case of two monopoly unions for various
values of the elasticity of substitution. w1(w2) thick line, w2(w1) thin line.
In the two-monopoly-union case the Nash-equilibrium is stable (although
indeterminate for  = 1):
This is not necessarily the case if m > 3.
As in the simplied two-union case assume that all skills are perfect com-
plements,  = 0; and that each union unilaterally sets the wage rate for the
workers it organizes, " = 1:
Unit costs, production (and employment rate), price and expected income
of members of union no 1 (union utility) are given by
c =
1
m

mX
j=1
wj;Q =
1
2m

 
m 
mX
j=1
wj
!
P =
1
2m

 
m+
mX
j=1
wj
!
;V1 =
1
2m

 
m 
mX
j=1
wj
!
 w1
Maximizing V1 with respect to w1 gives the rst order condition (reaction
function) and corresponding (maximum) root of the transition matrix,
w1 =
m
2
  1
2

mX
j=2
wj;  =  m  1
2
<  1
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The Nash equilibrium is unstable, jj > 1 In case one unions wage rate
di¤ers from the equilibrium level, the vector of wage rates will diverge from
the Nash equilibrium through progressively increasing uctuations:2664
w1
w2
w3
w4
3775
0
=
2664
x
0
0
0
3775 ;
2664
w1
w2
w3
w4
3775
1
=
2664
0  0:5  0:5  0:5
 0:5 0  0:5  0:5
 0:5  0:5 0  0:5
 0:5  0:5  0:5 0
3775
2664
x
0
0
0
3775 =
2664
0
 0:5x
 0:5x
 0:5x
3775
2664
w1
w2
w3
w4
3775
2
=
2664
0:75x
0:5x
0:5x
0:5x
3775 ;
2664
w1
w2
w3
w4
3775
3
=
2664
 0:75x
 0:875x
 0:875x
 0:875x
3775 ;
2664
w1
w2
w3
w4
3775
4
=
2664
1: 312 5x
1: 25x
1: 25x
1: 25x
3775
Employer power attenuates but does not solve the intrinsic instability
problem.
For " < 1 and  = 0 the Nash-expression to be maximized in the bar-
gaining process between the employer and the union no. 1 is
N1 = "lnV1+(1  ")ln = ("+ 2  (1  "))ln
 
1
4

 
2  w1  
mX
j=2
wj
!!
+"lnw1
The f.o.c. and the maximum root of the transition matrix are, respectively
w1 = " 
 
1  1
2

mX
j=2
wj
!
; 1 =  "
2
 (m  1)
The Nash-equilibrium is stable only if m < 1 + 2
"
. In case of " = 0:5,
stability requires that the number of skills and unions are less than ve.
For  > 0 (and  = 1;  = 0), the root 1 = (m  1)  1 is given by
1 =  
 
(m  (m  1)  )2  "
2 " + 

+  m  (1  ) 
(m  (m  1)  )2  "
2 " + 

+ (m  (m  1)  ) m  (1  )
(44)
The function is depicted in gure 3 below for " = 0:5 and, respectively,
m = 2 (thick line) and m = 4 (thin line). The vertical lines depict max = 2
for m = 2 and max = 43 for m = 4:
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Figure 3: Lambda 1 as a function of the elasticity of substitution. m = 2
(thick line), m = 4 (thin line).
As illustrated, relaxing the assumption that  = 0 does not solve the
instability problem. On the contrary, the possibility of substitution increases
the intrinsic instability of a labor market organized by skills unless  is rather
close to max =
 
m
m 1 + 
 1

(the non-negativity condition). The explanation
is that intra-skill substitution (competition) makes it even more advantageous
to react on other unionswage increases by lowering its own wage demands.
5.1.2 Inter-rm competition
The second term of the largest root of the transition matrix
2 = 2  (n  1) m =
a2(n 1)m
nm(1 +)(1 )d
(m  1) + (a+d)a
m(1 +)(1 )d
is always positive.
In the simple case of  = 0;  = 1;  = 0 and, consequently, a = m;
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d = 1; 2 and  = 1 + 2 reduce to
2 =
m  (n  1)
2  n
 =  m  1
2
+
m  (n  1)
2  n =
n m
2  n
 >  1 if m > 3  n
Under these simplifying assumptions, a labor market organized in local
skill-based unions, LU , is unstable only in the highly implausible case that
number of skills is larger than three times the number of competing rms.
However in general, inter-rm competition is not su¢ cient to make a labor
market organized by skill stable. Figure 4 below depicts 1 (thin dashed line),
2 (thin solid line) and  = 1 + 2 (thick solid line) for m = 4; n = 10;
" = 0:5;  = 0:5;  = 1. The vertical line indicates the maximum value of
 consistent with a positive solution.
0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
Elasticity of substitution
Lanbda
Figure 4: Lambda as a function of the elasticity of substitution (thick
solid). Lambda 1 (thin solid), lambda 2 (thin dash).
As illustrated, inter-rm competition (n > 1) still leaves a signicant
range around  = 1, in which the labor market is unstable. To avoid falling
in this trapthe unions need to cooperate.
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5.2 Optimum organization: A cartel of cooperating in-
dependent skill-specic unions
Cooperation is required to reach the optimum wage level and to avoid ac-
tions that might destabilize the labor market. However, cooperation is not
unproblematic. Forming a cartel that deprives the individual unions of their
decision-making power is incentive incompatible14.
To see the problem consider the case of the merger of two (formerly)
independent unions of unequal size. The governing body is assumed to be
democratically elected among selsh members of the two groups and to make
decisions according to the one-person-one-vote rule. In this case the decisions
of the cartel will reect only the interests of the larger group. There is no
median voter to ensure that a democratic process approaches some rea-
sonable compromise. Thus, if union 1 is the larger one, then the objective
function of the cartel, Vc; e¤ectively reduces to V1. On the other hand, the
smaller group has the advantage of being small: The cost to the employer of
bowing to their demand is smaller and, consequently, the employer is likely
to be more inclined to do so (Hersoug 1983). One may argue that these
problems can be solved by giving each group the right to veto mutual de-
cisions. However, the right to veto is not credible. After having given up
their independent organization, the members of the minor union cannot be
condent that the governing body of the joint union will, in fact, comply
with such rules after the merger has been e¤ected. With no such guarantee,
a joint union is a viable model of union cooperation only if the members of
the merging unions have identical skills and interests (and, consequently, it
does not matter who makes the decisions)15.
Incentive compatibility requires that the individual unions are deprived
of incentives to cheat and that the cooperation is organized in a way that al-
lows the cooperating unions to maintain their independent organization and,
14Holden and Raaum (1991) are pessimistic as to the possibility to reach a cooperatetive
solution. They argue that there is a need to coordinate wage moderation but that a binding
agreement is di¢ cult to enforce because of lack of credible threats. Joint negotiations
arent possible either because of opposing views on important issues. Hersoug (1983)
note that side payments are not easy to imagine and suggests that the unions agree on a
proportional reduction relative to the Nash-equilibrium wage rates.
15Jun (1989) argues that workers form a joint union when the size or productivity are
similar. However, he does not consider the fact that the two groups may not remain of
exactly the same size in the future. What is meant by similar productivity is unclear
unless the two skills are perfect substitutes.
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thereby, the option of withdrawing from the cooperation if the outcome of the
joint decisions is less satisfactory than the best alternative non-cooperative
outcome. This will be the case if the cooperation is based on the following
simple and easily controllable principles:
(1) The competence to negotiate the wage rates for all skills is transferred
to the joint body.
(2) In case the unions cannot agree, any wage o¤er is subject to the
general clause that it is not binding until all wage rates have been settled.
6 Conclusion
In most countries labor is organized in cooperating skill-specic unions rather
than in industrial cartels or totally independent skill-specic unions. Within
an extremely simple of a small open economy facing imperfect competition
we show that this way of organizing labor can be explained as the outcome
of rational (optimizing) behavior on the part of the unions.
Organizing labor in local industrial cartels (regardless of skill) or a single
economy-wide cartel results in a real wage level that is inappropriately low
both from the point of view of labor and the society as a whole unless labor
has close to monopoly power in the wage setting process.
Organizing labor in local or economy-wide skill-specic unions may result
in a wage level that is too high. In addition, a labor market organized in
non-cooperating unions is likely to be unstable.
This dilemma calls for a compromise: A cartel of cooperating, indepen-
dent skill-specic unions that enforce agreed demarcations. Cooperation is
needed to curb the negative externalities of too high wage rates set by unions
that are too strong. Independence (some degree of uncoordinated negotia-
tions between the employers and unions, each of which has the power to
inict considerable loss by calling a strike) is required to produce the neces-
sary pressure on the employers to raise the wage level to the optimum level.
And demarcations are required to stabilize the labor marked.
The degree and the form of the cooperation depend inter alia on the
bargaining power of the employer, the number of skills and competing rms
and the rigidity with which the unions enforce lines of demarcations.
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